# LaTeX code in bib file fields

I have bib files created with JabRef 3 that have LaTeX code in the Annote and Comment fields, see example below. When I open these with JabRef 5, I get the warning:

1. Error occurred when parsing entry: ‘Error in line xx or above: Empty text token.
This could be caused by a missing comma between two fields.’. Skipped entry.

If I remove the LaTeX code from those fields, JabRef 5 handles the file with no apparent problem. Unfortunately, with that code present JabRef 5 skips the whole entry, not just the problem fields in the entry. JabRef 3 has no problems with these bib files.

I have 2 questions:

1. Is there something fundamentally different in JabRef 5 that requires it to have different behaviour in this respect from JabRef 3? Or could this behavior be changed in a future release of JabRef?

2. Is there a workaround that I could use with JabRef 5 to get it to retain entries that have LaTeX code in the Annote and Comment fields?

I am aware of the posting “JabRef 3.8.2 can’t read .bib file created by JabRef 3.0 #2799” but my problem seems to different because I get the same message even when I delete “/” before “}”.

I am using macOS Mojave 10.14.6

An example (single entry) bib file displaying this problem is the following:

% Encoding: UTF-8

@Article{Hart-Moore(1990):JPE,
Title = {Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm},
Author = {Hart, Oliver and Moore, John},
Journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
Year = {1990},
Month = {December},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1119-1158},
Volume = {98},
Abstract = {This paper provides a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should be carried out within a firm and when through the market. Following Grossman and Hart, we identify a firm with the assets that its owners control. We argue that the crucial difference for party 1 between owning a firm (integration) and contracting for a service from another party 2 who owns this firm (nonintegration) is that, under integration, party 1 can selectively fire the workers of the firm (including party 2), whereas under nonintegration he can “fire” (i.e., stop dealing with) only the entire firm: the combination of party 2, the workers, and the firm’s assets. We use this idea to study how changes in ownership affect the incentives of employees as well as those of owner-managers. Our framework is broad enough to encompass more general control structures than simple ownership: for example, partnerships and worker and consumer cooperatives all emerge as special cases.},
Annote = {Paper file H. Use model in which value to set of agents S (chosen from total number I) who control set of physical assets A, denoted v(S,A|x) depends on human capital investments x=(x_1,âŠ,x_{I}) that enhance own productivity in the sense that v^{i}(S,A|x)=0 if i not in S (superscript indicating derivative) and are complementary in the sense that v^{ij}(S,A|x)=0 for j not equal to i. Define a control structure for physical assets alpha(S) and assume x not contractible ex ante. Add a strict superadditivity condition so that ex post the maximum total value V(x)=v(S_,A_|x)>v(S,A|x)+v(S_\S,A_\A|x), where S_ is the set of all agents and A_ is the set of all assets and assume that each agent’s share of V(x) is given by his Shapley value, denoted B^{i}(alpha|x). Show the following. (1) Get underinvestment in x. (2) If only one agent is to invest, he should own (control) all assets. (3) For any S, each asset should be controlled either by S or by its complement. (4) Should never have more than one agent with veto power over use of an asset. (5) If asset is idiosyncratic to agent i (that is, v^{j}(S,A|x)=v^{j}(S,A[a_{n}]|x) for all j not equal to i for any S), he should own it. (6) if agent i is indispensable to an asset (that is, v^{j}(S,A|x)=v^{j}(S,A[a_{n}]|x) if i not in S for any S), he should own it. (7) If group of agents G is key to an asset (that is, v^{i}(S,A|x)=v^{i}(S,A[a_{n}]|x) if S contains no more than half the agents in G for all i in any S), control of it should be decided by a majority of G. (8) If two assets are strictly complementary (that is, v^{i}(S,A{a_{m}}|x)=v^{i}(S,A{a_{n}}|x)=v^{i}(S,A{a_{m},a_{n}}|x) if i is in S), they should be controlled together. (9) If agent k is dispensible (that is, v^{j}(S,A|x)=v^{j}(S{k},A|x) for all S) and has no investment, k should have no control rights. (Corollary is that outside party 0 for whom v(SU{0},A)=v(S,A)+v(0) for all A and S should have no control rights.) (10) If (S^,A^) and (S~,A~) are economically independent (that is, v^{i}(S^US~,A^UA~|x)=v^{i}(S^,A^|x) if i is in S^ and =v^{i}(S~,A~|x) if i is in S~), they should be independently controlled. (11) Suppose an agent i with an investment has an essential asset a_{n} owned by a second agent (that is, v^{j}(S,A|x)=v^{j}(S{i},A|x) if a_{n} is not in A for all S containing j and all A), then i’s incentive to invest is increases if the second agent takes ownership of all assets. (12) Suppose asset a is essential to group {w} and a^{} is essential to i who is dispensable, then i should not own a if a^{} is owned by somebody else. (Also on index card if cannot read directly.)},
Comment = {This is full TEX version of Annote. Use model in which value to set of agents S (chosen from total number I) who control set of physical assets A, denoted v\left( S,A\mid x\right) depends on human capital investments x=\left( x_{1},\ldots ,x_{I}\right) that enhance own productivity in the sense that v^{i}\left( S,A\mid x\right) =0 if i\notin S (superscript indicating derivative) and are complementary in the sense that v^{ij}\left( S,A\mid x\right) \geq 0 for % j\neq i. Define a \emph{control structure }for physical assets \alpha \left( S\right) and assume x not contractible \emph{ex ante}. Add a strict superadditivity condition so that \emph{ex post }the maximum total value V\left( x\right) \equiv v\left( \underline{S},\underline{A}\mid x\right) >v\left( \underline{S},A\mid x\right) +v\left( \underline{S}% \backslash S,\underline{A}\backslash A\mid x\right) , where \underline{S} is the set of all agents and \underline{A} is the set of all assets and assume that each agent’s share of V\left( x\right) is given by his Shapley value, denoted B^{i}\left( \alpha \mid x\right) . Show the following. (1) Get underinvestment in x. (2) If only one agent is to invest, he should own (control) all assets. (3) For any S, each asset should be controlled either by S or by its complement. (4) Should never have more than one agent with veto power over use of an asset. (5) If asset is \emph{idiosyncratic }to agent i (that is, v^{j}\left( S,A\mid x\right) \equiv v^{j}\left( S,A\backslash \left[ a_{n}\right] \mid x\right) for all j\neq i for any S), he should own it. (6) if agent i is \emph{% indispensable} to an asset (that is, v^{j}\left( S,A\mid x\right) \equiv v^{j}\left( S,A\backslash \left[ a_{n}\right] \mid x\right) if i\notin S for any S), he should own it. (7) If group of agents G is \emph{key }to an asset (that is, v^{i}\left( S,A\mid x\right) \equiv v^{i}\left( S,A\backslash \left[ a_{n}\right] \mid x\right) if S contains no more than half the agents in G for all i in any S), control of it should be decided by a majority of G. (8) If two assets are \emph{strictly complementary }(that is, v^{i}\left( S,A\backslash \left\{ a_{m}\right\} \mid x\right) \equiv v^{i}\left( S,A\backslash \left\{ a_{n}\right\} \mid x\right) \equiv v^{i}\left( S,A\backslash \left\{ a_{m},a_{n}\right\} \mid x\right) if i\in S), they should be controlled together. (9) If agent k is \emph{dispensible }(that is, v^{j}\left( S,A\mid x\right) \equiv v^{j}\left( S\backslash \left\{ k\right\} ,A\mid x\right) for all S) and has no investment, k should have no control rights. (Corollary is that outside party 0 for whom v\left( S\cup \left\{ 0\right\} ,A\right) =v\left( S,A\right) +v\left( 0\right) for all A and S should have no control rights.) (10) If \left( \underline{\hat{S}},\underline{\hat{A}}\right) and \left( \underline{\tilde{S}},\underline{\tilde{A}}\right) are \emph{% economically independent }(that is, v^{i}\left( \hat{S}\cup \tilde{S},\hat{A% }\cup \tilde{A}\mid x\right) \equiv v^{i}\left( \hat{S},\hat{A}\mid x\right) if i\in \hat{S} and =v^{i}\left( \tilde{S},\tilde{A}\mid x\right) if % i\in \tilde{S}), they should be independently controlled. (11) Suppose an agent i with an investment has an \emph{essential asset }a_{n} owned by a second agent (that is, v^{j}\left( S,A\mid x\right) \equiv v^{j}\left( S\backslash \left\{ i\right\} ,A\mid x\right) if a_{n}\notin A for all % S\subseteq j and all A), then i's incentive to invest is increases if the second agent takes ownership of all assets. (12) Suppose asset a is essential to group \left\{ w\right} and a^{\ast } is essential to i who is dispensable, then i should not own a if a^{\ast } is owned by somebody else.},
Keywords = {Asset Ownership, Specific Investments, Property Rights, Firm Integration}
}